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 Security cooperation is a vital component to the national security of the United 
States. Despite this fact, insufficient military or academic attention has been applied to 
the subject.  The academic and professional void created by this inattention has led 
academic, journalistic, and military professionals to misuse the term security cooperation, 
and stray from its doctrinal description as defined by the Department of Defense 
Dictionary and Associated Military Terms. The academic rigor required to properly 
express the concept of security cooperation as a peace-time strategy has been absent from 
both the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, and has led executives 
from each department to attempt to redefine its strategic potential. The National Security 
Council, the Secretary of State and the Commanding General of Central Command have 
attempted to redefine security cooperation as a military strategy capable of supporting the 
post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The erroneous attempt by our 
strategic leadership to define security cooperation as a strategy necessary to extract the 
U.S. from its current wars, deviates from the doctrinal definition of security cooperation, 
and limits its chance of achieving success if and when it is properly defined and executed. 
A clear understanding, definition and implementation of the term security cooperation are 
essential to the development of a National Security Strategy and improve the potential 
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Security cooperation: Security cooperation involves all [Department of Defense] 
interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense 
relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly 
military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for and multinational 
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the [host 
nation]. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to 
care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping 
operations. [Geographic combatant commanders] shape their [areas of responsibility] 
through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to 
complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The [geographic 
combatant commander’s] security cooperation strategy provides a framework within 
which [combatant commanders] engage regional partners in cooperative military 
activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a 
potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military 
intervention. 1 [emphasis mine]  
 
Introduction 
 Ten years after commencing military operations in Afghanistan, and seven years 
after then-President George W. Bush declared, “Mission accomplished!” from the flight 
deck of the USS Lincoln, the United States continues to engage Afghanistan in a long and 
costly military operation while simultaneously attempting to withdraw all of it military 
forces from the country of Iraq.  Billions of dollars have been spent and thousands of 
lives have been lost during the Afghan conflict that, as yet, has no end in sight; and, in 
recent years, a complex and growing insurgency has threatened to destabilize 
reconstruction efforts, complicating efforts to craft a viable exit strategy.   
 At the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, the United States military 
experienced significant domestic turmoil in and around the Sunni Triangle due to the 
disbanding of the Iraqi military and the “de-baathification” process that removed 
essentially all Baath Party officials loyal to Saddam Hussein.  In the wake of massive 
unemployment that followed the purging of Baath Party loyalists an insurgency 
                                                 
1
  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations, ed. 
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2011), 116. 
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movement formed and took root as a challenge to the United States occupation of Iraq.  
In response to the growing insurgency, the U.S. military resurrected and re-purposed a 
doctrine designed to combat insurgents and gave it the name COIN or counter-insurgency 
doctrine.  One of the key components to COIN is the civil-military relationship developed 
between the host nation and the U.S.; this relationship was given the label Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams and anointed as the process by which the United States would 
transition civil authority to the newly developing Iraqi government and gracefully exit the 
Iraq War.  The strategy of employing Provincial Reconstruction Teams was also adopted 
in Afghanistan as the means to achieve military success and set the stage for the United 
States to withdraw from Afghanistan.  
 The self identified requirement of the United States to reconstruct both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, after the conclusion of hostilities, as the precursor to the successful 
withdraw of military forces, demanded a strategy capable of meeting these self-imposed 
restrictions.  The Bush Administration developed and employed a reconstruction plan that 
used Provincial Reconstruction Teams as a bridge to re-establish the Iraqi and Afghan 
infrastructure destroyed during the invasion and occupation of both countries.  
Constitutional limitations prevented the re-election of President Bush and limited his 
ability to follow through on the implementation of his reconstruction plans.  President 
Obama’s successful presidential election was in part linked to his promise of ending the 
war in Iraq.  As the newly elected leader of the U.S., President Obama had to distinguish 
himself from the Bush Administration and one of the ways he did so was in the 
development of his 2010 National Security Strategy.  
 The 2010 National Security Strategy adopted the philosophy of defensive liberalism 
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to define the way that the United States would attempt to influence international events.  
One on the strategies that President Obama articulated in this document was security 
cooperation; a strategy that was intended to rebuild the damaged infrastructure of a 
country, serve as the means to remove military forces from Iraq, and establish the 
conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately the use of 
security cooperation as a strategic tool for reconstruction that ultimately supports a 
military withdraw from post-conflict countries is in direct contradiction with its doctrinal 
definition.  Security cooperation by definition is a strategic military tool intended to be 
used during times of peace in an effort to prevent future conflict.  The faulty 
terminological use of security cooperation to described a U.S. exit strategy from the Iraq 
and Afghan wars created a false impression of what a strategy of security cooperation is 
capable of achieving.   
 Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material 
resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the 
Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies 
in foreign countries.  The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available 
to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. 
military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation 
state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from 
properly defending its geographic borders.  The host nation’s request for support from the 
U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect 
its people and limit internal or external threats.  The security cooperation exercise Baltic 
Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 
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provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct 
response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders.  In this scenario Estonia is 
attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort 
to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing 
Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders.  In contrast 
to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent 
conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to 
define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on 
the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure.  The false labeling of reconstruction 
operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.             
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) form the backbone of the reconstruction 
effort in Afghanistan.  PRTs are composed of U.S. military, U.S. State Department, and 
USAID officials who collaborate with local Afghan leaders to identify and initiate the 
most needed reconstruction projects at the provincial level.  Current events and recent 
literature suggest, however, that policy-makers and military planners, alike, are struggling 
to distinguish between security cooperation and the role of the PRT.  The failure to 
properly differentiate security cooperation from stability and reconstruction operations 
detracts from the capabilities of security cooperation and limits its capabilities as a tool to 
promote and maintain peace.2  A particularly concerning trend is the growing propensity 
of planners to conflate the post-hostilities reconstruction role of the PRT with the pre-
                                                 
2
  John A. Mauk, "A Risk-Based Approach to Strategic Balance." Carlisle Papers (2010), 
10 February 2011, 11-12.  
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hostilities strategy of security cooperation (SC).3  In an effort to provide clarity on the 
subject, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert England drafted a Department of Defense 
directive that defined security cooperation.   
security cooperation. Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage 
and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic 
objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security 
establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build 
defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including 
all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host 
nations.4 
 
The directive was published in order to establish a baseline understanding of security 
cooperation as a mission.  A common understanding of Department of Defense 
expectations with regard to security cooperation ideally would help planners use the 
strategy in ways that are consistent with the official definition. 
 This is an issue that has garnered little attention from those whose job it is to 
employ the strategy of SC, primarily because those same planners are the ones 
perpetuating the mistake. 5  The conflation of reconstruction efforts with SC is 
understandable given that both are strategic tools embedded into the medium of stability 
operations. Stability operations is an overarching term that spans the breadth of military 
operations used in peacetime security cooperation missions, crisis response activities, and 
                                                 
3
  U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan: Clinton's Remarks at House Hearing on Afghanistan, Pakistan," Embassy of the 
United States of America, Brussels, Belgium, http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/us-policy-
afghanistan-and-pakistan (accessed 11/13, 2011).; United States, "The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America," (2010).  
4
  Robert England, "Department of Defense Directive: DoD Policy and Responsibilities 
Relating to Security Cooperation," DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance 
Management 30, no. 4 (2008), 28. 
5
  Clarence J. Bouchat, "An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security," 
DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management 29, no. 1 (Feb, 2007), 
99.; Gregory J. Dyekman, "Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st 
Century," Strategic Studies Institute (2007). 
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combat operations.6 Stability operations exist in a variety of forms. The chart below taken 
from Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, illustrates the variety of operational tasks 
included in stability operations.7 
 
 A broad spectrum of operational environments exists in Afghanistan, ranging from 
the relatively friendly provinces of Panjshir and Bamyan where the Taliban has 
historically been unwelcome to the Taliban dominated provinces of Helmand and Ghazni. 
Operational environments that are peaceful and stable like Panjshir and Bamyan could 
support security cooperation activities if the whole of Afghanistan were at peace. In a 
stable environment, it would be appropriate to use security cooperation activities that 
reinforce host nation security efforts to minimize Taliban influence in the region.  
                                                 
6
  United States Joint Forces Command, Stability Operations, ed. Director for Strategic 
Plans and Policy, Vol. Joint Publication 3-07, 2011). 
7
  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations, 36. 
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Provinces such as Helmand and Ghazni, however, where violent Taliban insurgencies 
continue to take American lives in large numbers, are operational environments that are 
not conducive to security cooperation and negate the use of SC as a viable strategy to 
quell the insurgency.8   
 Despite the difficulty of simultaneously managing a variety of strategies in the 
complex medium of stability operations, planners must guard against misunderstanding 
and misapplying military strategies.  SC holds great potential as a tool of military 
diplomacy that can help to build trust in international relationships where trust has been 
at a deficit.9  Yet lack of understanding and misapplication of the term among policy 
makers and military planners threatens to reduce the effectiveness of security cooperation 
as a strategy which could potentially strengthen relationships between the United States 
and host nations, and reduce the possibility that the U.S. may be drawn into armed 
conflict.  
China is questioning the value of Washington's plan to strengthen military cooperation 
with Australia and update its defense treaty with the Philippines. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin called for discussions about the boosting of American 
troop deployment in East Asia, questioning just how cooperation would benefit the 
international community. 
 
In Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin expressed reservations 
about the measures.  He questioned how the United States will justify the expense of its 
East Asia military expansion in the face of what he described as the sluggish global 
financial situation. He also questioned the benefits of such cooperation, saying any 
"outside interference" would affect the peace, stability and development that both 
Washington and Beijing say they want. 10 
                                                 
8
  Ibid.; Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition 
Warfighting Center, Joint Operation Planning, ed. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Vol. 
Joint Publication 5-0, 2011).; United States Joint Forces Command, Stability Operations. 
9
  Alexander T. J. Lennon et al., "Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy from Promotion to 
Support," Center for Strategic and International Studies (2009). 
10
  Peter Simpson, "China Expresses Reservations about US-Austatrlian Security Pact," 





It is, therefore, important to identify how the issues associated with the inconsistent and 
inappropriate applications of the term, security cooperation in the conflict in Afghanistan 
has raised concerns with potential adversaries such as China.  
 In summary, the problem that motivated this thesis is the recognition that there is 
confusion in the definition and recent application of security cooperation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and concerns that the confusion will lead this valuable strategy to be 
dismissed before it is properly articulated.  This problem will be addressed by describing 
a research based and effective application of security operations that supports host nation 
autonomy and minimizes the possibility of the United States being drawn into armed 
conflict. 
 
Background and Need for the Study 
 The precise use of words by Department of Defense officials is critical to 
formulating and executing military strategy.11 When developing a plan of action, loosely 
defined military terms can affect planners’ abilities to properly understand the actual 
capabilities resident in a proposed course of action.12  In Afghanistan, the misapplication 
of the military term security cooperation fostered a climate that caused the Department of 
Defense and State to underestimate the significant role of SC in fostering the diplomatic 
relationships that contribute to international peace and stability.   
 As a major in the Marine Corps, I planned and participated in a security 
cooperation exercise with Estonia. It was important to the United States European 
                                                 
11
  Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 
Center, Joint Operation Planning. 
12
  Ibid. 
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combatant commander and the commanding general Estonian Self Defense Force that 
communication with the media specifically addressed our operation as a security 
cooperation exercise. Eighteen countries participated in the exercise, to include the 
United States and Estonia, and sixteen other countries that are part of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). However, this exercise, named BALTIC OPERATIONS, 
was not officially a NATO exercise. 
 This distinction between security cooperation exercise and NATO exercise may 
seem like nothing more than semantics. However a misunderstanding of the semantic 
nuances had potential negative strategic consequences.  Estonia shares a border with 
Russia and former Soviet military forces occupied Estonia prior to the 1991 Singing 
Revolution.  Diplomatic tensions between Estonia and Russia remain tense and Estonia is 
constantly defending its territorial waters in the Baltic Sea against Russian naval vessels.  
During the exercise a Russian frigate and a Russian submarine attempted to violate 
Estonia’s territorial water. In response, Estonia deployed a small portion of its Navy to 
block the Russian vessels and force a return to internationally recognized neutral waters 
shared by countries bordering the Baltic Sea.  This level of international tension between 
Estonia and Russia is constant. If the participants of a security cooperation exercise were 
to describe the event as a NATO exercise, it would be interpreted by Russia as a signal 
that NATO forces, led by the United States, were rehearsing air, land, and sea strategies 
in the Baltic Sea that would support an amphibious assault against the Russian city of St. 
Petersburg.  This instance and many others like it demonstrate that the improper use of 
military terminology can have unintended negative consequences. 
 According to the authors of a paper written for USAID, the reconstruction strategy 
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in Afghanistan, is often mislabeled as security cooperation, and designed to support the 
withdraw of United States military forces from Afghanistan.13 This example 
demonstrates the tendency to confuse Afghan reconstruction with SC.  SC is a pre-
hostilities strategy to effectively and peacefully resolve emerging problems prior to the 
eruption of violence and the need to commit U.S. forces to a contingency operation.14 
This is contrasted with reconstruction, a term that describes aid provided during and after 
military conflict. This contrast highlights the need to protect the integrity of the SC and 
the importance of identifying operations where SC is confused.  Indeed one of the basic 
assumptions under which I will proceed with this thesis is that SC, properly defined, 
occupies a critical role in the overall strategy to prevent the United States from entering 
into armed conflict rather than a strategy employed after hostilities have commenced.  
 Military doctrine, national strategy, and specialized dictionaries for military 
professionals and government policy makers, present a precise definition of  and specific 
criteria for the strategic application of security cooperation.15  Yet a review of case 
studies by organizations like the United States Agency for International Development and 
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs that focus on Provincial 
                                                 
13
  Abbaszadeh Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David 
Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, Taya Weiss, 
"Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations. Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations," Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs (January 2008, 2008), 02 April 2011.; William Rosenau, 
Acknowledging Limits Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Marine Corps University Press, 2011). 
14
  Clarence J. Bouchat, "An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security," 
DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management 29, no. 1 (Feb, 2007), 
99. 
15
  Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, ed. Chairman, US NATO Military Terminology Group, Vol. Joint 
Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 601. 
 16 
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, demonstrates that the current application of 
security cooperation is inconsistent with its doctrinal definition.16 Moreover, my 
professional military experience with the doctrinal application of security cooperation 
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams provides a first hand account that reinforces the 
observation that doctrinal definition and contemporary practical application of Security 
cooperation are inconsistent.   
 The literature review will establish the premise that security cooperation as an 
academic area of study receives little attention.17  The paucity of literature on the subject 
contributes to the current misunderstanding of the definition as well as its improper 
strategic utilization.  Authors who participate in scholarly conversation on the topic fall 
into one of two categories, doctrinal use or modern misconception.18  The contradictory 
nature of the literature further supports my hypothesis that the definition of security 
cooperation is frequently not applied in Afghanistan. 
 The history of security cooperation provides an unambiguous storyboard that 
details the inception and proper application of the foreign relations strategy. Current 
events in Afghanistan and elsewhere appear to reflect a distorted image of historical 
precedent for security cooperation. However, the evidence will show this distortion not 
only to be the fault of a poor understanding and application of security cooperation by 
                                                 
16
  Ciminelli Paul, Morris Sharon, Muncy Donald, Nugent Al, Stephenson James, Wilson 
Tod, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan an Interagency Assessment 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Agency International Development,[2006]). 
17
  Bouchat, An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security, 99. 
18
  Ibid.; Gregory L. Hager, "Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation 
Plans" (Master of Strategic Studies, United States Army War College), .; Ethan B. 
Kapstein, "Do Three Ds make an F? The Limits of "Defense, Diplomacy, and 
Development"," Prism 1, no. 3 (2010), 21.; William S. Lind, "Fourth Generation War," in 
Military Reform, eds. Winslow T. Wheeler and Lawrence J. Korb (Westport, Connecticut 
London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 194-219. 
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planners, but also to be the fault of United States foreign policy that compounds the 
problem of achieving clarity because it confounds the doctrinal definition and 
implementation of security cooperation. 19 
 Indeed, actions taken by the Department of Defense in an effort to shorten the 
duration of the war in Afghanistan, coupled with foreign policy statements made by the 
Secretary of State, demonstrate the extent to which misunderstanding and a 
misapplication of the term has permeated the vested departments of the government.  I 
will attempt to illustrate how far the Department of Defense and State Department 
planners and policy makers have wandered from the precepts developed at the strategy’s 
inception by providing examples of case studies that depict an unvarnished execution of 
security cooperation strategy when it is properly centered on its seminal concepts.20  
Additionally, I will reinforce the critical concept that security cooperation was devised as 
a powerful tool meant to promote international peace and to prevent the necessity of the 
United States entering into armed conflict. 
Purpose of the Study 
 Words have meaning and the unique ideas that are transmitted through the use of 
military vocabulary demand that the author and the orator communicate with specificity 
and clarity. In the case of security cooperation, my research indicates that military 
professionals, government officials, and academics appear to be equally guilty of failing 
to limit their use of the term to its correct context. Most egregiously, the term is being 
                                                 
19
  Hager, Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans. 
20
  Michael D. Mihalka and Mark R. Wilcox, "Unintended Strategic Consequences of 
Security Assistance in the South Caucasus," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 57 (2010), 24-31.; 
Simpson, China Expresses Reservations about US-Austatrlian Security Pact; William A. 
Stuebner and Richard Hirsch, "Mindanao A Community-Based Approach to 
Counterinsurgency," Prism 1, no. 3 (2010), 21-138. 
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improperly used as an important element that describes the United States exit strategy 
from Afghanistan.21  An example of the recent comments made by the Secretary of State 
as she described the current state of affairs in Washington, D.C. and Afghanistan, that the 
State Department convened an interagency team, including DOD, USAID, and the NSC 
and held discussions that resulted in an agreement that included strong commitments on 
economic/social development, democratic institution-building, human rights, anti-
corruption, and other important long-term reforms.  Mrs. Secretary follows up on this 
statement by saying; “Ambassador Crocker and General Allen are still working through 
some of the security cooperation issues with President Karzai”.22 To place these 
comments into context, the Honorable Mrs. Clinton was incorrectly describing the peace 
process in Afghanistan and the withdraw of U.S. forces as security cooperation.   
 Doctrinally, security cooperation is unrelated to a military withdraw from a country 
at the conclusion of armed conflict.23   I was caught by surprise; therefore, to discover 
that despite the efforts of the Department of Defense to accurately articulate its 
professional lexicon via a dictionary of military terms and doctrine, basic concepts and 
their associated framework of action were being misused. 24  Initially I thought that I was 
encountering isolated instances of misuse, but further reading led me to believe that the 
                                                 
21
  United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
22
  U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Policy in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan: Clinton's Remarks at House Hearing on Afghanistan, Pakistan," Embassy 
of the United States of America, Brussels, Belgium, http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/us-
policy-afghanistan-and-pakistan (accessed 11/13, 2011). 
23
  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations. 
24
  Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 601. 
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misapplication of this particular term was wide spread. 25   
 What I perceived to be endemic failure in the correct use of vocabulary led me to 
question my own professional knowledge and personal experience with security 
cooperation. During my thirteen years in the Marine Corps I have often been involved in 
security cooperation operations.  From 2002 to 2004 I lived in Okinawa, Japan where I 
participated in security cooperation exercise throughout the Japanese archipelago, 
Thailand, and Korea. In 2010, I was involved in security cooperation activities in Estonia 
and in 2008 I was involved in reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  The commonality between 
all my experiences in the Asian Pacific, and my involvement in security cooperation in 
Europe, is that the United States was participating in a professional exchange of ideas and 
capabilities with stable countries during a time of peace for each country.  Yet, the 
understanding I had of security cooperation as an active participant was not bearing out in 
the policy statements issued by the State Department and the United States Central 
Command; nor was it reflected in the National Security Strategy.26  My professional 
experiences placed the execution of security cooperation as a peacetime strategy whereas 
current policy and strategy were defining security cooperation as a means to exit 
Afghanistan.   
 The conflicting relationship between my professional experience with security 
cooperation and the contemporary conversation regarding security cooperation and a 
                                                 
25
  U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan: Clinton's Remarks at House Hearing on Afghanistan, Pakistan, 1; United 
States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America;James N. Mattis, 
"Statement of U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, U.S. Central Command 
Commander, before the Senate Armed Services Committe," United States Central 





successful exit strategy from Afghanistan were the seeds for a burgeoning cognitive 
dissonance.  The purpose of this study is to identify how the term security cooperation is 
being applied to operations in Afghanistan as well as to assess the extent to which it is 
misunderstood. As a corollary to these questions, I will also discuss the specific 
definition of security cooperation and evaluate the doctrinal use of the term within the 
context of national strategies designed to promote national security. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
1. The doctrinal definition of security cooperation is being used as a synonym for 
reconstruction in the National Security Strategy.  
2.  The use of security cooperation as a synonym for reconstruction in Afghanistan has 
led to a common misconception of its strategic capabilities. 
3.  When security cooperation is appropriately applied outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, it 
will be perceived as a threat by outside observers because it is currently being used as a 
combative tool to quell a counter-insurgency and support a transition of authority in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
 The philosophical underpinning of security studies is recognized by and informs the 
choices made by policy makers.27  Security studies provides a common theoretical 
framework that helps support the decisions necessary to develop the foreign policy and 
                                                 
27
  Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 384.  
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the strategic plans that employ security cooperation as a means to meet policy goals.28 
The National Security Strategy published by the current President of the United States 
and his National Security Council, elevates security cooperation to one of the primary 
means toward achieving U.S. security abroad.29  
Prevent the Emergence of Conflict: Our strategy goes beyond meeting the challenges of 
today, and includes preventing the challenges and seizing the opportunities of tomorrow. 
This requires investing now in the capable partners of the future; building today the 
capacity to strengthen the foundations of our common security, and modernizing our 
capabilities in order to ensure that we are agile in the face of change. We have already 
begun to reorient and strengthen our development agenda; to take stock of and enhance 
our capabilities; and to forge new and more effective means of applying the skills of our 
military, diplomats, and development experts. These kinds of measures will help us 
diminish military risk, act before crises and conflicts erupt, and ensure that governments 
are better able to serve their people.30 
 
The Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy make the same 
statement that security cooperation is a critical component in achieving U.S. security 
abroad. The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy state: 
Build the Security Capacity of Partner States 
Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of 
World War II, DoD has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and 
partner states. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with 
and learn from their counterparts. These efforts further the U.S. objective of securing a 
peaceful and cooperative international order. Security cooperation activities include 
bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and 
financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional 
military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in 
building competency and capacity. In today’s complex and interdependent security 
environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more 
important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners’ security 
capacity as an increasingly important mission.31 
 
Our foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of 
life. In the current operational environment, this means each component of our Joint 
Force will remain aligned to achieve success in our ongoing campaign in Afghanistan 
and security cooperation efforts with Pakistan, and against violent extremism 
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The U.S. military understands the actions needed to achieve strategic success using 
security cooperation as the means to preserve international security, but what is missing 
is a foreign policy that provides a consistent definition of security cooperation. 33  The 
international security studies theories of realism and liberalism described below provide a 
framework to assist the decision making process of policy makers and can guide their 
development of a security strategy that consistently applies the doctrinal definition of 
security cooperation. 
 Realism and liberalism are major theoretical foundations that reach across the 
disciplines of international relations and international security studies.34 In this case, the 
term “theory” is a little misleading.  The study of international relations and international 
security studies cannot support the development of a predictive policy that, if applied 
time and again would net the same result.  Theory is best viewed as a philosophical 
framework that offers suggestions on how and why a particular foreign policy should be 
crafted. 35   As philosophies that inform the development of foreign policy, realism and 
liberalism are reasonable points from which one can both anchor a discussion that is 
trying to bridge the gap between philosophy and strategy, as well as find the middle 
ground of policy development.  
 Realism centers on the use of power, a tenet central to the use of military 
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organizations, and seeks to balance power in an effort to prevent or limit the actual use of 
force in order to maintain order. 36 The doctrinal definition of security cooperation is 
centered on the military’s use of its non-violent power to influence the decisions of 
foreign countries in an effort to establish regional stability and security. 37 Liberalism 
focuses on the pursuit of international security and peace through the exportation of 
ideology when viewed through the lens of proactive actions used by the military to 
achieve its goals. 38  Peacetime goals that are achieved by partnering with foreign 
countries using security cooperation align with liberalism and its suggestion that 
cooperative relationships between countries is necessary to maintain international peace 
and stability. 39 The security studies concepts of realism and liberalism provide two 
dominant theoretical narratives that challenge each other and paradoxically support the 
use of non-violent military operations to achieve international security.  Realism and 
liberalism serve as the theoretical underpinning of this thesis project. 
Methodology 
  The first course of action I took to verify that there is an emerging conflict between 
the definition and use of specific military terminology was to conduct an in-depth review 
of military doctrine.  Like the civil sector of society, the military has developed a 
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dictionary to define the words it employs. 40  As a matter of efficiency and accuracy the 
Department of Defense issues both written and verbal orders to compel action from its 
subordinate commanders and personnel.  The language of orders draws heavily from the 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as a means to 
communicate complex ideas using words that are understood universally across the 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.  I use the Department of Defense dictionary 
to identify the precise and accurate definition of security cooperation.  After establishing 
a baseline definition for the military term security cooperation I transitioned to military 
operation manuals to verify that the common definition of security cooperation was 
consistent with its proscribed use. 
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the titular head of all four 
branches of the military service.  As the appointed leader over all United States military 
forces, the chairman must be able to provide a standard model of communication that 
unites the efforts of the military departments.  Joint publications, which form the 
backbone of military doctrine, are the means by which the chairman achieves the 
daunting task of developing a shared vision across the Department of Defense.41  Joint 
Operations is the seminal document, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, which sets the standard vision for all branches of the military service to follow.  I 
reviewed the doctrine and discovered that security cooperation is a component of Joint 
Operations and its definition and strategic use was consistent with the dictionary 
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definition of the term.  I cross-referenced the strategic concept of security cooperation 
with other manuals in the joint publication series and found that the planning and 
implementation of strategies connected to security cooperation remained anchored to the 
dictionary and Joint Operations explanation.  While I was cross-referencing the term I 
was surprised to find that the perceived usefulness of the capabilities inherent in Security 
cooperation was limited to peacetime operations.42  I was surprised to discover that the 
perceived usefulness of security cooperation was limited to peace time operations 
because as I was developing a research question last year I initially examined security 
cooperation from the contemporary, but incorrect perspective. I considered the 
application of security cooperation using the Afghanistan model as a post-conflict 
strategy to achieve conflict resolution.   
 As I examined the joint publication manuals, it became clear that the Department of 
Defense holds a linear view on the conduct of military operations. 43  Additionally the 
way that the Joint Chiefs of Staff graphically depicts military operations suggests that 
campaigns are infinitely repeating on the x-axis. The figure, Notional Operation Plan 
Phases Versus Level of Military Effort provides a pictorial representation of linear 
military operations.44  Since military operations are linear, and doctrine outlines when 
Security cooperation is useful, I was able to draw a conclusion from my research that I 
could specifically identify points on the x-axis where the employment of security 
cooperation was consistent with dictionary definition and doctrinal employment of the 
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strategy during times of peace.  I wanted to test my conclusion, so I also used the 
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy to 
validate or disprove my initial findings.     
 
 
 The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military 
Strategy are documents that establish a common vision for the Unites States and the 
Department of Defense. 45  The flow chart (Figure II-1) is an illustration of how the 
documents interact with each other. 46  
                                                 
45
  J. Bartholomess, ed., Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 413. 
46
  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations, 5. 
 27 
 
 All of the documents use vocabulary from the Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military Terminology and Associated Terms, and apply concepts discussed in the joint 
publication series that is distributed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The 
majority of the National Security Strategy document employed the use of the term 
security cooperation appropriately with one significant exception: the strategy to 
transition authority to the Iraqi government as United States forces withdraw from the 
country.47   
 The improper use of the term security cooperation seemed like an anomaly or, 
better yet, poor word selection given that the broad scope of the National Security 
Strategy left its authors considerable room to make errors. However further research into 
this apparent outlier using policy statements issued by General James N. Mattis, 
commanding general United States Central Command, and documents chronicling the 
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development of an Office of Security cooperation- Iraq, provided compelling evidence 
that the National Security Strategy was using the wrong vocabulary to convey how the 
United States would transition authority to the Iraqi government. 48 49 I studied the 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy documents to determine if 
the faulty use of the term security cooperation was translated into the bodies of these 
documents, and I came to the conclusion that both strategies appropriately applied the 
term security cooperation in its definition and strategic action. 50   
 Reviewing my findings, I wondered if the named strategy to withdraw from Iraq 
had been poor wording, and I decided that I should compare the exit strategy from Iraq to 
the exit strategy for Afghanistan to determine if there were similarities in the words 
selected to communicate the ways in which the United States would withdraw its military 
forces.  My review of policy statements made by the Secretary of State, as well as and 
studies conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies Institute and the United States 
Central Command, led me to believe that the term security cooperation was deliberately 
selected to define the process employed by the United States to exit Afghanistan as well 
as Iraq. 51 52  This discovery further supported my hypothesis that the term security 
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cooperation is being misappropriated in the National Security Strategy and the exit 
strategies for both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 The unanswered conundrum of my research is why, when terms such as 
reconstruction and stabilization operations exist to accurately describe the United States 
exit strategies from Iraq and Afghanistan, planners and policy-makers persist in 
incorrectly using the term security cooperation to describe the process of a responsible 
withdraw of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. 53 The misuse of the term security 
cooperation to describe the means by which the United States will leave Iraq and 
Afghanistan erodes the true strength of such a strategy, the prevention of war. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 My research is limited in its scope to properly identifying the military term security 
cooperation and it does not seek to correct the greater problems that emerge from 
identifying an error in the use of military vocabulary.  Identifying the greater problems 
falls outside the scope of this project because it would encompass unraveling the 
complexity of the National Security Council and its process of developing foreign policy 
and it would require an untangling of the relationship formed by the State Department 
and Department of Defense as a result of foreign policy developed around the 
misapplication of the term security cooperation.   It is also my hypothesis that the United 
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States Government suffers from systemic problems in the way that it crafts its strategies 
and policies, problems that are specifically embodied in the misconceptions of security 
cooperation. Neither does my research provide corrective measures to contemporary 
policy and strategy; it merely identifies the root cause of the problems that military 
commanders and civil servants experience as a result of misapplication of the concept of 
security cooperation.  Second, the complexity of the medium of stability operations that 
runs across the range of military operations, (see figure I-2) and influences the 
employment of security cooperation receives only a surface treatment. 54  Stability 
operations, by doctrine, are simultaneous and continuous throughout all phases of 
military operations, and they use security cooperation and reconstruction as the means to 
accomplish its assigned missions.  The compounding factor of stability operations 
significantly contributes to the misunderstanding of security cooperation; however, my 
research does not specifically address the ways that stability operations lead to a misuse 
of the term security cooperation.  In the attempt to demonstrate how security cooperation 
is misunderstood I do not want to risk adding a confusing element to this paper by 
parsing out the nuances of stability operations across the range of military operations.   
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 During the data collection portion of my research I began to feel like the main 
character from George Orwell’s novel 1984, Winston Smith, who worked for the 
Ministry of Truth.  Joint Publications provide a very clear definition for security 
cooperation as well as the time and places where it should be used.  Yet my research 
seemed to be painting a picture of policy-makers and military strategists discarding these 
concrete definitions for a creatively interpreted version of security cooperation. 55  
Security cooperation became “newspeak”, instead of a term used to describe a strategy 
that could prevent war. Security cooperation became the phrase for picking-up-the-pieces 
after the United Stated finished its military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
“newspeak” term for security cooperation was adopted by contemporary authors who 
used it in their articles to describe exit strategies from Iraq and Afghanistan that were 
published in military journals. 56  The pervasive linguistic misuse of security cooperation 
led the wider audience to adopt the incorrect use as the correct definition.  My research 
will not immediately correct this common misconception; one that has been reinforced 
and perpetuated in various media over the past few years, but it is my expectation that 
bringing the situation to light will be the first step towards reinvesting the term security 
cooperation with its rightful strategic and diplomatic capital. 
 
Significance of the Study 
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 The strategy of security cooperation, if properly defined and employed, can result 
in foreign policy that uses all aspects of the government to address its national security 
concerns by providing assistance to foreign nations while minimizing the need to employ 
combat power. 57 The United States has shouldered much of the financial and personal 
cost of fighting war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 58 Did the choice to enter into armed conflict 
with both Iraq and Afghanistan serve the national security interests of the United States? 
Did the United States seek to exhaust all resources within the government, to include 
security cooperation, prior to entering into armed conflict? These questions are debatable. 
The negative fiscal impact of these military ventures is not debatable, nor is the 
requirement to provide a credible national defense.  
 Internal and external economic crises threatens the financial stability of the United 
States and forces lawmakers to consider ways to reduce the cost of running the country. 
In the wake of the financial problems confronting the United States, problems that are 
partially a result of its foreign policy decisions, the Constitutional obligation in Section 8 
of the Constitution of the United States still exists and Congress must continue to provide 
for the common defense of the country. 59   My research on the misapplication of security 
cooperation suggests that the United States has inappropriately vested its resources in a 
false understanding of security cooperation.  The result has led to policymakers, both 
civilian and military, to place an unrealistic expectation on what can reasonably be 
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achieved by misusing security cooperation when actually engaged in reconstruction. 60  If 
the current use of security cooperation were to return to its doctrinal roots and become 
distinct from reconstruction and stability operations, U.S. policy makers could align 
security cooperation as a tool for developing alliances and preventing war.  In doing so, a 
national security strategy could be developed based on security cooperation activities, 
and that would maintain a credible defensive posture that actively sought to prevent war 
and the economic costs associated with participating in international conflict. 
 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
 Security cooperation is a strategy that meets the requirements of securing 
America’s national defense as outlined in the National Security Strategy. 61 As a strategy 
SC is the use of national power with the stated goals of improving, strengthening, and 
reinforcing relationships with foreign countries. 62   SC involves the use of diplomatic, 
informative, military, and economic means to create cooperative relationships. 63  A 
strategy of SC is carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD) with the cooperation of 
the Department of State.64 SC has not been thoroughly addressed as an area of interest 
within the academic field of security studies, nor has it been widely written about in 
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military literature. SC does not garner much attention because it does not use the military 
in traditional ways and it does not seek to achieve political goals through the use of direct 
violence.65 The Strategic Studies Institute published a white paper in 2007 written by 
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat titled An Introduction to Theater Strategy and 
Regional Security. In his forward to the white paper, Douglas Lovelace, Director of the 
Strategic Studies Institute, made the following observation, “While the Strategic Studies 
Institute does not normally publish curricular material, this is the second time a subject 
has been deemed of sufficient importance and utility that it is now offered to a wider 
audience.”66 Lovelace further expands on the importance of SC and the limited 
publications that address this important subject, saying “…[d]espite [the] importance [of 
SC]…little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance is available on how they [SC 
strategies] are planned and implemented.”67 LtCol Bouchat echoes Lovelace’s concerns 
when he states in his introductory paragraph, “…[d]espite [security cooperation’s] 
importance to military and national strategy…there is little definitive or comprehensive 
information available on theater strategy”.68 The author also reveals in his endnotes that 
the military manual used by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Theater Engagement 
Planning was rescinded on February 17, 2006, and that other document has taken its 
place. The official reason for this decision was that the Department of Defense 
determined that security cooperation is nothing more than common sense, and that it does 
not require a comprehensive document to guide the actions of generals who supervised 
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diplomatic relationships across continental landmasses.69 My research into SC will 
expand the understanding of this topic by identifying how the doctrinal definition of the 
term is misused as a strategy to exit from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Security cooperation: Misused, Abused, and Always too Late 
 Although I agree with Director Lovelace and Lt Col Bouchat in their assessment 
that security cooperation has not received serious attention, it is still prudent to review the 
key points of the few articles that have been written on the topic of security cooperation.  
I elected to only include articles describing security cooperation during the past ten years 
because of the Title X authority directing the Department of Defense to carry out security 
cooperation activities as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011. 70  It was 
my assessment that contemporary literature would be of greater value to my research 
because the misuse of the term security cooperation emerged during the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 71  Contemporary literature also simultaneously treats security cooperation 
activities as strategic policy, operational art, and tactical necessity. This unfocused 
treatment of the topic allows me to point out how the term security cooperation can be 
easily misinterpreted and misapplied. 
 If I were critiquing the Bouchat article, I would report that a bureaucracy has been 
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created around the management of security cooperation activities. From a strictly 
technical stance this criticism would be correct. The principle components of security 
cooperation, from a Department of Defense perspective, are, Foreign military sales 
(FMS); Foreign military financing (FMF); International military and education training 
(IMET) programs, and; Excess defense articles (EDA) transfers to define security 
assistance.72 Figure 8 (below) provides examples of each security cooperation activity.   
 
 The use of any one of the activities would constitute a component of a 
comprehensive strategy based on a policy to employ security cooperation as a method of 
achieving the national security goals of the United States. The point that my criticism 
would miss is that a whole government approach rather than a piecemeal one is required 
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to realize an effective strategy based on security cooperation.73  
 Contemporary authors like Kapstein, and Lind, who write on the subject of security 
cooperation consider security cooperation as a strategy or ground level tactic that takes 
place at the conclusion of war time hostilities but prior to the departure of United States 
and allied forces from foreign soil.74 These authors also discuss the six basic activities 
associated with security cooperation; however they also include strategic and tactical 
contributions to the cooperative strategy by the Department of State and its subordinate 
and independent branches, United States Agency for International Development, United 
States Agricultural Department, the United States Department of Justice, and other 
similar organizations.75 
 Kapstein’s article is an assessment of security cooperation and its practical limits. 
The author is actually discussing the concepts of reconstruction. However, he incorrectly 
uses the term security cooperation rather than reconstruction. The author centers his 
assessment on the acronym 3D’s or Defense, Diplomacy, and Development, the 3D’s 
used by both the State Department and Department of Defense to describe a grand 
strategy of security cooperation that is designed to support the reconstruction of Iraq and 
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Afghanistan. It is Kapstein’s opinion that like so many other acronyms this is a hollow 
catch phrase that lacks a thoughtful, disciplined approach necessary to actualize the 
intended goals of the strategy or foreign policy that embraces the 3D’s. His primary 
criticism is that the 3D’s are a means to achieve a strategy, not a complete strategy in 
themselves. The words Defense, Diplomacy, and Development are not a strategy, they 
are organic tools used by most government in the execution of foreign policy.76 
 Kapstein makes the appropriate assessment of 3D’s as a tool to carry out an as of 
yet to be formulated foreign policy strategy. Highlighting the validity of security 
cooperation as a grand strategy places the concept in an appropriate arena that will 
influence the action of strategic, operational, and tactical leaders.77 Temporally however, 
Kapstein misses the mark, in his article, the 3D’s are assessed as hollow words that are 
applied to post conflict, reconstruction operations. 78  In placing the notion of 3D’s as a 
post conflict tool for supporting reconstruction operation, Kapstein fails to see that his 
imprecise use of the terms, security cooperation and reconstruction, blur the utility of 
developing a thoughtful foreign policy that uses the 3D’s as its tools to achieve success. 
In his analysis the tools become nothing more than mop, bucket, and broom, utility items 
that clean up messes rather than defining strategy. 
 William S. Lind is a military thinker and author of great renown. His thoughts on 
maneuver warfare have shaped the way that the Marine Corps has equipped itself and 
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trained to fight the wars of this country.79 A recent contribution on the development of 
future Marine Corps doctrine is his article titled Fourth Generation War, 2007.80  Lind’s 
article describes a future battlefield that is simultaneously, strategic, operational, and 
tactical. In this battlefield he sees a Marine Corps that uses a sociological approach that 
understands the emergence of feelings of hatred, anger, and resentment that develop in 
foreign populations. This knowledge is used to work more effectively with the populace 
to achieve United States National objectives. 81  To contrast his vision of the future Lind 
describes how the Marine Corps successfully used his philosophy of maneuver warfare to 
quickly defeat the Iraq and Afghan forces during the initial stages of each conflict. At the 
conclusion of conventional fighting the Marine Corps transitioned to reconstruction 
operations while continuing to apply the doctrine of maneuver warfare. Using maneuver 
warfare in reconstruction operations required a defined enemy that could be suppressed 
and then attacked. In reconstruction operations however this proved to be a fatal flaw that 
sparked a determined insurgency. It is only now, nearly a decade after the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan began, that the Marine Corps has adjusted to the notion that it must 
approach this new phase of warfare from a sociological perspective. 82 
 In his approach to solving the problem of fourth generation warfare, Lind 
incorporates the strategy of security cooperation. Lind does not explicitly express his 
solution to fourth generation warfare as the six activities associated with security 
cooperation. Instead, Lind speaks to removing the current focus from population-centric 
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warfare in occupied countries to the identification of policy decisions that cause feelings 
of hatred and resentment to well up in foreign populations and that are expressed through 
violence. The ways in which the Marine Corps might be able to achieve this objective is 
through partnering with local populations, the key component to security cooperation. 83 
 Lind’s use of security cooperation as the means to address the complex problem of 
fourth generation warfare is visionary. Unlike Kapstein, Lind uses the tools that support a 
strategy of security cooperation correctly. Lind does not focus on reactive measures to 
solve the social problems present in fourth generation warfare, instead he uses the tools 
of security cooperation to assess problems and address them before they reach the point 
of violence.84 Unlike other authors cited in this review, Lind applies the tools of security 
cooperation as a preventative tactic. Unfortunately Lind, like Kapstein, temporally places 
his social warfare tactics in phases two and four on the warfare phasing model. The graph 
below depicts the phasing model.85 
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  Lind’s approach to fourth generation warfare is an attempt at normalizing relations 
prior to initiating combat operations or an ameliorative to be used in an effort to prevent 
an insurgency at the conclusion of conventional warfare.86 Although Lind does not place 
the use of security cooperation in its appropriate place, phase zero, the prevention of 
hostilities, he has placed necessary emphasis on using the tools of security cooperation as 
a measure to avoid war and as a tactic to identify and mitigate insurgencies that form at 
the conclusion of combat operations. 
 Lind, and Kapstein, are important contributors to the emerging body of literature 
focused on security cooperation. This literature review has identified security cooperation 
as both a reactive tool that supports the withdraw of military forces from foreign soil that 
has been previously categorized as a war zone and as a comprehensive strategy 
implemented, prior to political maneuvers in preparation for war, that can potentially 
prevent the initiation of armed conflict. 
 
Security cooperation Poorly Defined 
 The tendency of authors of recent articles as well as combatant commanders is to 
place security cooperation activities at the conclusion of armed conflict. This leads to 
confusion with regard to what security cooperation is and what it is designed to achieve. 
The Phasing Model shown in Figure III-17 below is composed of six phases ranging from 
Phase 0 to Phase V.  On this scale domination of the enemy during war is indicated at 
Phase III.  Security operations are designed to be used as a shaping tool to avoid armed 
conflict and is employed during Phase 0. 





Instead of using the precise technical definition provided by the Department of Defense 
on military operations, contemporary authors are using security cooperation to describe 
the action taken during phase IV, establish security, and phase V, transition to civil 
authority. Authors like Kapstein and Menkhaus are applying the wrong definition to 
security cooperation when they incorrectly define security cooperation activities as the 
actions taken at the conclusion of armed hostilities.87 The term reconstruction is more 
appropriate and it incorporates the notion that nations that are victorious in war, have a 
moral obligation to support and restore order and functionality to the defeated state.88 
 Reconstruction is a requirement for U.S. military forces that occupy foreign 
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territory at the conclusion of hostilities.89 In light of the political sensitivities surrounding 
both the Iraq War and the Afghan War, the notion of the United States as an occupying 
force was unacceptable. In order to implements the requirements associated with 
reconstruction, without acknowledging the United States as an occupation force, 
politicians had to find politically acceptable terminology in order to shape the discussion 
on how the United States should restore the defunct governments of both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.90 An example of the use of politically acceptable terminology is the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams that have proliferated throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In title they are serving as an occupying force engaged in reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan while in practice they are addressing the litany of requirements outlined in 
the Joint Publication Stability Operations.91 In practice and as discussed by authors on the 
subject, the military has shouldered the responsibility and authority of occupation and 
reconstruction and then given it the incorrect title: security cooperation.92 The actions 
taken during security cooperation and reconstruction are vastly different and as such must 
be kept separate in order to appropriately align organizational capacity and capability. 
 In his book, Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just 
Another Drill, Rietjens uses the work of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
Afghanistan as a case study to investigate the level of cooperative behaviors between the 
Dutch Military, Afghan police, military, and civil leaders.  Rietjens’ case study is again 
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situated after the conduct of hostilities. In his analysis of Dutch participation in civil-
military activities with the people and institutions of Afghanistan, Rietjens concluded that 
the cooperative actions taken by both Dutch and Afghan parties were necessary and 
successful. However, it required an environment akin to a natural disaster in order for 
local participation to reach a level of participation that could achieve a measure of self-
sustainment.93 Rietjens described effective civil-military operation as a response to a 
complex emergency. He believed that the strategy for civil-military cooperation should 
be developed as if a country were responding to a natural disaster. His theory further 
suggests that security cooperation activities are an intervention to be used after combat 
has subsided rather than a developmental peace-keeping strategy implemented before 
combat ensues. Linking the Dutch military response to the Afghan civil structure and 
focusing on the cooperative actions between the Dutch and the Afghans kept his case 
study rooted in the basic activities that define security cooperation and again was based 
on the misuse of the definition of security cooperation.94 
 In contrast to Rietjens incorrect placement of security cooperation activities at the 
conclusion of armed conflict between countries, Hager appropriately identifies security 
cooperation as a strategy carried out in peacetime prior to the onset of hostilities.95 In 
Hager’s analysis security cooperation is a strategic tool used by the United States that 
creates formal and informal social exchanges between the Unites States and other foreign 
countries. Social connections created between host nation countries and the United 
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States, during peacetime, through peaceful military interaction served well for the United 
States national security strategy. The Department of Defense used the strategy of security 
cooperation to carry out the six basic functions of the security cooperation activities in 
addition to other significant actions not covered by the doctrinal definition of security 
cooperation.96  
 Hagar’s article describes the development, coordination, and execution of a security 
cooperation plan that was delegated to combatant commanders; generals who had 
achieved the highest rank in the military and were assigned a region of the globe and 
given authority by Senate confirmation to lead all military affairs in their assigned area of 
responsibility. The social exchange between the United States militaries and foreign 
militaries gave the combatant commanders the opportunity to engage foreign countries in 
the following areas, military professionalization, support of democratic values, 
humanitarian assistance, counter-drug, and counter-terrorism.97 For the most part none of 
these areas are part of the doctrinal activities associated with security cooperation. An 
argument could be made that military professionalization and the counter-terror and 
counter-drug interactions could be aligned with traditional security activities but at the 
present these activities fall outside that scope. 
 The important point that should be taken away from Hager’s article is that with the 
exception of humanitarian assistance, all of the actions that the combatant commanders 
were taking were preventative measures. The combatant commanders, according to 
Hager, understood the utility of shaping perceptions and attitudes while simultaneously 
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building diplomatic relationships to overcome challenges that threatened civil-military 
interaction with the United States. The commanders recognized that security cooperation 
strategies implemented during Phase 0 operations were in the best interest of the United 
States and its national security interests. Hager’s article also highlighted that the strategic 
guidance provided by the President of the United States in his 1995 National Security 
Strategy officially recognized security cooperation operations as “a formal peacetime 
engagement planning process”.98 The formalized planning process was unfortunately 
doomed from the beginning as a result of poor funding.99 This unfortunate ending to an 
otherwise proper temporal placement and strategic execution of security cooperation is 
the ideal framework from which to implement a national security strategy based on 
security cooperation.  
 
Interagency Cooperation: The Road to Success 
 Abbot, Grossman, Meese, and Rosenwaser materially contribute to the topic of 
security cooperation via their discussion of interagency cooperation. These authors 
believe that security cooperation was necessary to achieve success in developing and 
executing United States foreign policy.  The authors recognize that the United States will 
typically place the burden of diplomacy on the military and expect the Department of 
Defense to craft interagency solutions that involve other government agencies to create 
political and social stability within a proscribed area.100 Unfortunately like Rietjens and 
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Menkhaus, these authors frame the need to develop an efficient and effective interagency 
process in the backdrop of post conflict operations.101 In situating the need for 
interagency cooperation as a result of the post-conflict, reconstruction environment the 
implication is that interagency cooperation is most needed at the conclusion of armed 
conflict. Abbot and his co-authors frame his argument in the following way; the complex 
nature of capacity building in a post conflict environment requires that the Department of 
Defense invest in the education of its officer corps. The specific point made is that 
officers should be trained as experts in an assigned geographic region and then stationed 
and employed in such a way as to maintain the officer’s regional cultural expertise. 
Abbot is not suggesting a revamp of the current Regional Area Officer program that 
results in careers that cap out as a Colonel. Instead he is recommending that the 
Department of Defense create command opportunities for the regional experts that enable 
them to reach the rank of General and use their cultural knowledge and political influence 
as a General to support security cooperation strategies and improve international 
relationships between the United States and other foreign governments.102 
 The need for interagency collaboration is not new to the military. In fact the 
Goldwater-Nichols act, created the senior U.S. military command position, Chairman of 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to more efficiently man, equip, and train the Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marine Corps forces that comprise the United States military environment.103 
Meese and Abbot offer similar points of view. Instead of approaching the topic of 
interagency cooperation as a means of achieving a national security, via Department of 
Defense wide personnel restructuring, he believes the structures currently in place are 
sufficient and advocate for enhanced interagency cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act changed the military so that it actively addressed the needs for interagency 
cooperation by encouraging the development of a joint warrior culture through joint 
education and joint assignments.104  Joint education and assignment are important to the 
successful implementation of security cooperation strategies because the responsibility to 
execute security cooperation strategies does not belong to a single military service nor 
does the responsibility belong solely to the Department of Defense.   
 Meese takes his argument a step further and comments on the impact of a joint 
environment, interagency cooperation, and the career path of military officers. Like 
Abbot, Meese points out that there are clear roadblocks in the career path of a military 
officer that must be overcome if the officer is to achieve success beyond the rank of 
Colonel. 105  Meese demonstrates that Title X (ten) of the United States Code places a 
prohibition on officers attaining the rank of general if the officer has not served in a joint 
billet. The Department of Defense, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols act, has placed a 
premium on operating in joint and interagency environments. In order for an officer to 
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achieve the rank of general they must be able to work and thrive in jobs that place them 
outside the comfort zone of their specific military department. 106 Selection to the rank of 
general, predicated on a successful job performance in joint or interagency environments, 
should mean that officers selected to the rank of general would have the necessary 
interagency experience to develop and influence security cooperation strategies.   
 Interagency cooperation is important in light of the need to integrate the 
Department of Defense and Department of State when dealing with stability and 
reconstruction operations and in developing a national security strategy based on security 
cooperation. Rosenwasser believed that interagency cooperation is vital not only to the 
success of peacetime foreign policy but also post conflict stability and reconstruction. 
Rosenwasser described United States Diplomat Robert Murphy, as an instrumental 
representative of State Department during World War II. Robert Murphy’s diplomatic 
efforts during World War II were vital to the successful invasion of French North Africa. 
The ability of Robert Murphy to work with United States Army General Clark, 
despite the belligerent atmosphere fostered by General Clark, demonstrated the great 
need for interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense.107 
 
Nesting Security Cooperation in the field of International Security Studies: 
Philosophy and Policy Decisions 
 
 Why did the United States enter into a state of war with Iraq and Afghanistan? Did 
the U.S. have an alternative to deploying its resources into combat? Depending on who 
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you ask the answer will vary.  The military thinker, Clausewitz, is famous for making the 
observation that war is an extension of politics by other means.108  This leads us to ask 
what political reasons did the U.S. use for entering into armed conflict?  Going one step 
further we ask the more fundamental question what were the philosophical underpinnings 
that caused the U.S. to make the decision to engage in armed conflict?  The answer is the 
philosophies of international relations and the academic field of study international 
security studies. 
 International relations (IR) examines the foreign policies of countries and the 
thought process that drives foreign policy decisions. The need to study and examine the 
decisions and actions of international leaders evolved from the global consequences of 
World War I and World War II. This is not to say that a general interest in how leaders at 
the international level formulate their decisions did not exist. The opposite, in fact, is 
true. As early as the Greek state of Athens and the author Thucydides, historians, 
scholars, and leaders have been interested in the decisions made by states and their 
leaders. The classic philosophers have extensively covered the methods, and decisions of 
states and their leadership.109 The comprehensive cataloging and categorization of each 
philosopher and separation of their thoughts and concepts into specific decision making 
arenas did not occur until the 20th Century. The process of systematically cataloging and 
analyzing the various philosophies that inform and influence the decisions and actions of 
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state and leaders is the field of IR.110 
 The result of organizing the intellectual driving force that fuels the decision making 
cycle of countries emerged as two competing philosophies. Realism and liberalism are 
the two primary IR philosophies that influence the problem solving efforts of national 
leaders. Before outlining each major IR philosophies it must be stressed that these 
philosophies are ‘isms” and not theory.111 To clarify, states and other international actors 
do not make decisions based on realist theory, nor is there a set of replicable steps that if 
applied to realism theory could be repeated time after time and expect the same results. 
Instead these two IR categories should be viewed as a way of thinking that helps shape 
and support the decisions made by states and their leaders.  Understanding IR categories 
as philosophies helps to highlight both the capabilities and limitations of each. 
 Philosophies inform thought and help structure decisions, no more or less. 
Choosing a philosophy, like Realism for example, provides a framework for types actions 
and expected consequences that result from specific policy decisions. The capability to 
identify an expected outcome based on actions derived from a thought process fed by 
Realism is the strength of IR. Philosophy as previously noted is limited to an intellectual 
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exercise and not a substitute for policy. Continuing with the example of realism; a policy 
analyst would not be able to use the philosophy of realism and pre-determine the specific 
actions a policymaker must employ to achieve a desired policy result based on the 
conceptual framework of realism. Instead of using a philosophy to gauge the future 
results of the policy maker, the analyst must observe the policymaker develop his plan of 
action based on the available resources of his nation-state as opposed to the philosophy 
that influenced his choices. The inability of a philosophy to provide a template solution to 
support the policy making process is the weakness of IR. 
 Morgenthau, the author credited with developing the field of IR, authored the 
concept of realism that became the cornerstone of IR. The philosophy of realism is 
centered on the point that states act in their own self interests and are always seeking 
ways to accumulate power in an effort to secure their survival and meet their needs, 
defined as interests.  The state, governed by a set of laws rooted in human nature, focuses 
on its own self-interests and gives primacy to power. The actions of a state are free from 
moral judgment and the political leaders of the state, when acting in the capacity as a 
representative of the state, are also free from moral judgments and constraints.112   
 Morgenthau’s work inspired Kenneth Waltz to contribute to the philosophy of 
realism. Waltz’ contributions to realism were the foundations of neorealism. Neorealism 
drew from the Realist vision that a state seeks power to satisfy its self interest and added 
a twist. Neorealism situated the state within an arena of international actors who were not 
governed by any set of laws and sought to establish a balance of power between nation 
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states.113   World War II is an example of states seeking a balance of power. During 
World War II Germany threatened the balance of power. Two weaker nations, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, who were ideological enemies, combined their powers to 
topple Germany. After Germany was defeated the threat to balance was eliminated. The 
alliance between the United States, and the Soviet Union dissolved and a balanced 
international power structure was restored.  Like neorealism eloquently points out, 
chaotic space seeks balance, so to did the study of IR.  The introduction of liberalism as a 
competing conceptual thought process provided balance to the IR field. 
 Liberalism emerged at the conclusion of World War I as a challenge to realism. The 
study of liberalism emphasizes observing how leaders use the writing of established 
thinkers to shape their decisions.  Classic liberal thought valued freedom, individual 
rights, morality as a guide to individual and state actions, patriotism, nationalism, private 
ownership, and free market principles. Philosophers who placed a premium on individual 
morality, limited governments founded on democratic principles, and economic systems 
that subscribed to the principle of free markets exemplify liberalism. The realist notion 
that the state is the primary actor in the international relations arena is challenged by the 
IR philosophy of liberalism.  A policy maker who forms their thoughts based on the 
philosophy of liberalism contend that the body politic has a voice in the actions of the 
state and the state must conduct its affairs with regard to morality.  
 At its core liberalism seeks ways to create a more peaceful society and is predicated 
on the notion of championing moral ideological concepts.114 The export of moral ideas is 
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thought to create social structures as barriers to violence. An example of social structures 
as barriers to violence is the American aphorism that democratic countries do not go to 
war against each other.  The development of barriers that restrict the use of force is then 
another way to interpret liberalism.  Ironically the opposite is also true, liberalism can 
induce the use of force. Vietnam and the first Gulf War are examples of the U.S. 
projection of moral values, based on the philosophy of liberalism, that resulted in the 
United States participating in combat.  As liberalism matured the idea of neoliberalism 
emerged and provided a counter the ideas of neorealism.  Neoliberalism challenged the 
concept that anarchy drives nations to seek balance of power via competition. Instead of 
anarchy equaling balance via competition, neoliberalism views anarchy as a means to 
create a network of interdependence between nations that fosters relationships that build 
on cooperation and mutual interest.115  The competing philosophies of liberalism and 
realism gave birth to an academic field of study know as International Security Studies 
(ISS).   
 The ISS field seeks to define the actions taken by a state that support the 
achievement of a particular policy.  The security studies field adopted the language, and 
structure provided by IR as its starting point.  Like IR, security studies has two distinct 
and competing branches of thought realism and liberalism.  The security policies of the 
U.S. have at varying times be shaped by realism and liberalism.  Paradoxically liberalism 
and realism are both consistent with the values of the U.S. and provide policy makers 
significant latitude when considering the future safety concerns of the nation.   
 Political leaders who use the concept of realism to craft their decisions are focused 
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on power. Nations collect power via strong militaries capable of imposing a credible 
obstacle to foreign powers. National power is also achieved through an economy that 
sustains vibrant production, and markets geared to support trade. This power can be used 
in two way offensively or defensively. Defensive realism seeks to maintain a balance of 
power between nations, offensive realism involves expanding its power.116 The two sub-
sets of Realism seek to maintain state power in two distinctly different ways. The policies 
of containment championed by George Kennan, and detente by Henry Kissinger during 
the Nixon administration are examples of Defensive Realism influencing the decisions of 
national and international leaders.117 Offensive Realism on the other hand focuses on the 
survival of the state by primarily using military means to secure an international 
advantage that will guarantee a states supremacy in the international arena.118 
Mearsheimer cites the expansion of Japan, Germany, and the former Soviet Union from 
1800-1945 as examples of Offensive Realism. Although both offensive and defensive 
realism achieve their means in significantly different ways; both operate on the premise 
established by the philosophy of Realism that a state seeks to achieve a greater level of 
relative power over it peer competing states.119 The dominant opposing argument to 
realism is liberalism and its quest for security through peace. 
 Liberalism is the philosophy of developing security via the exportation of 
democratic values and economic free market systems. Like Realism, Liberalism can be 
both offensive and defensive. Offensive liberalism is best described as nations exporting 
ideology by means of force, specifically military force. As noted above the Vietnam War 
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and first Gulf War are examples of offensive liberalism.  Defensive Liberalism is best 
defined as the use of soft power, or diplomacy to export ideology.120 Theater security 
cooperation consists of bilateral exercises, foreign military sales, and diplomatic cultural 
exchanges and is an ideal example of defensive liberalism. 
 Returning to the original question posed at the beginning of this section, the 
competing philosophies of realism and liberalism are the underlying intellectual 
framework that policy makers used to lead the U.S. into war.  Both realism and liberalism 
provide an alternative to war however the options presented to our policy makers did not 
include the options of balancing power or seeking diplomatic resolution.  The rational for 
involving the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan are in the past and should be used as 
cautionary tales to future policy makers.  In the future however it should be noted our 
policy makers have options, regardless of philosophical leaning, to prevent the 
commitment of U.S. resources to the task of war.   
 
Discussion 
Why Security cooperation Matters 
 The United States economy is currently under great strain. The U.S. debt is $15 
trillion and the defense budget for fiscal year 2012 is approximately $670 billion.121 In a 
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fragile economy it is imprudent to continue to expend national treasure at this rate.  
Regardless of cost, U.S political leadership is constitutionally obligated to provide for the 
common defense. 122  The executive and legislative branches of government are presented 
with a riddle; how do you save money and provide for the common defense 
simultaneously? By developing a U.S foreign policy that supports the implementation of 
a security strategy based on Security cooperation Activities. 123  A foreign policy 
developed around the properly defined tenets of SC can meet the demands of national 
defense and remain economically viable.  
 Although I argue against the use of SC as a post-conflict reconstruction strategy, 
the positive financial and resource impact of using a SC strategy cannot be ignored.  The 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reports that 90,000 U.S. personnel are 
serving in Afghanistan and the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
reported the 2010 cost of the Afghan war was $104.9 billion dollars.124 Provincial 
reconstruction teams are the physical expression of a security strategy based on security 
cooperation activities. The economic and personnel cost of all 12 provincial 
reconstruction teams in Afghanistan is $240 million and approximately 1,000 U.S. 
personnel.125 ISAF has linked its withdraw strategy from Afghanistan to the success of 
provincial reconstruction teams. In essence what this means is the U.S. has needlessly 
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deployed 88,000 service members and is wasting $104.6 billion dollars in defense 
spending. In light of an impending debt crisis, the military must consolidate its forces, 
reduce spending, and simultaneously maintain a credible defensive posture. Security 
cooperation strategies are the way that the United States of America can achieve this 
requirement. 
 Security cooperation has been an integral part of the military for the past 65 years.    
Almost since its inception, the United States military has interacted with foreign 
militaries during peacetime. Each of the military services regularly conducted exchanges, 
formally and informally, to improve military capability or interoperability. Geographic 
commanders found engagement to be a useful tool to establish security cooperation and 
continue to conduct military interaction activities to support national security objectives 
during peacetime.126 
 
Security cooperation (SC) is an intra-agency, defense strategy that in its most basic form 
identifies common concerns between nations and develops local solutions to solve shared 
problems.  An example of SC in phase zero operations is the strategic relationship 
between the U.S. and the Philippines and their combined efforts at resolving Muslim 
extremism on the Philippine island of Mindanao.  Philippine National Leaders are 
concerned that Muslim extremism on the island of Mindanao diminishes the economic 
viability of the island and creates a negative public opinion of the country. The U.S. is 
interested in maintaining its economic freedom of movement through the international 
waters off the coast of the Philippine archipelago and sees the Muslim extremists as a 
threat to economic freedom of the seas. Working together, the U.S. and Philippine 
governments develop a plan to address the extremist threat. The U.S. provides the 
resources to train and equip the government to defeat the Muslim extremists. The 
Philippine government uses its newly developed capabilities to solve the problem of 
                                                 
126
 Hager, Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans, iii. 
 59 
Muslim extremists inhibiting economic stability on the island of Mindanao. The success 
of this strategy is measured by the development and implementation of a solution to the 
problem of Muslim extremists by the Philippine government.127 In this example both the 
Philippine’s public image is improved and the U.S. concern for economic freedom of 
movement off the coast of the Philippine archipelago has been addressed. A second order 
effect is the U.S. has maintained a credible defense posture in the Pacific Rim without the 
expense of deploying the full weight of its military resources.  
 In describing SC through this example, it is important to recognize that the U.S. did 
not assume the lead role in solving a domestic concern in the Philippines. Assuming 
direct control of foreign domestic concerns is antithetical to the true definition of SC.  It 
is significant that the DOD and DOS worked together with the Philippine government to 
develop a solution to the problem of Muslim extremism. The fact that the DOD and DOS 
collaborated with the Philippine government to develop a holistic solution indicate a 
willingness on all parties involved to seek alternatives to direct violence.  The most 
critical aspect of this example is that the relationship between the U.S. and the 
Philippines was voluntary.  An equally important aspect of this case study is the solution 
to Muslim extremism on Mindanao was developed and implemented by the Philippine 
government.  Participation by the U.S. was in building the capacity within the Philippine 
infrastructure to successfully implement a plan crafted by Filipino leadership.  Voluntary 
participation combined with the development and implementation of local solutions by 
indigenous leadership is the cornerstone of SC.   
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 In contrast to security cooperation activities taking place during phase zero 
operations, William Rosenau provides his assessment of security cooperation activities 
that takes place during phase four operations in Afghanistan.  Acknowledging Limits: 
Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan is a monograph published by the 
Marine Corps University Press that explores police mentoring in Afghanistan from 2007-
2009.128  On the surface mentoring police and security cooperation do not seem to be 
related. IMET however is one of the principal assignments in security cooperation and a 
critical aspect of security assistance.  The very essence of police mentoring in 
Afghanistan is rooted in IMET, which in turn is a manifestation of security cooperation. 
Rosenau points out in his monograph that conducting police mentoring in the midst of a 
violent counterinsurgency netted few lasting results. 
But in many cases, progress appeared to be fleeting. As mentioned above, 
the police frequently slipped back into their old patterns. The nature of the 
environment in which they operated was part of the problem.  In areas 
with particularly high levels of insurgent activity, such as southern and 
southeastern Afghanistan, policing was a high-risk profession, with ANP 
[Afghan National Police] casualty rates far surpassing those of the ANA 
[Afghan National Army]. 
 
Given these perilous circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the police 
were reluctant to go out on patrol and perform operations that placed their 
lives at risk.  Drugs were readily available to relieve boredom and 
alleviate despair.  Opportunities to augment their salaries through crime 
and corruption were plentiful.129 
 
Rosenau did an admirable job of capturing the heart of the mentoring experience during 
the reconstruction and transition to civil authority phases of combat operations.  The 
difficulty that each police mentor team encountered was magnified by the fact the 
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International Security Assistance Force was still actively engaged in combat operations 
against the Taliban.  
 The lessons that Rosenau pointed out were not lost in the milieu of authors, policy 
makers and military professionals.  Two personalities, James Gibney and United States 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates acknowledged the lessons of improperly applying 
security cooperation strategy.   
Finally the lessons identified in this study have utility beyond 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan (and Iraq) may have what one scholar terms a 
“strong inoculative effect on future interventions,” and according to U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, “[t]he odds of repeating another 
Afghanistan or Iraq-invading, pacifying, and administering a large third-
world country-may be low.” Acting early to prevent what Gates terms 
“festering problems” from spinning out of control will obviate the need for 
large-scale military intervention later, in his view. Building the capacity of 
local police-and, in some circumstances, the capacity of irregular, tribal 
and informal policing structures-has an obvious role to play in a 
preventative approach to violent sub-national conflict.130 
 
In this quote the Defense Secretary nearly quoted verbatim the definition of security 
cooperation while simultaneously acknowledging that the cart before horse approach, 
with regard to security cooperation, that the United State took in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq was wrong.  Framing security cooperation activities like police mentoring as a 
preventative approach, which was described by Secretary Gates, is the correct doctrinal 
approach to security cooperation. 
 
Conclusion 
Policy and Strategy Must Align 
 Currently a foreign policy that points to the doctrinal use of SC as the means of 
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achieving U.S. foreign policy goals does not exist. A U.S. foreign policy that draws from 
defensive liberalism is an ideal way to shape the proper employment of a SC strategy.  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the first place where security cooperation 
emerges as a means to achieve security goals and the placement of SC in the NSS is 
appropriate; however, without a clear understanding of the definition of security 
cooperation, the DOD and DOS are improperly executing SC activities.  The most visible 
SC strategy, executed improperly, is the PRT in Afghanistan.131  The use of SC as a 
means to achieve post reconstruction goals improperly aligns means and ends.  SC is 
designed as a means to prevent armed conflict not as a means to resolve the conflict at the 
conclusion of hostilities.  
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 A lack of foreign policy that properly defines a strategy of security cooperation has 
led to its inappropriate use.  If SC is going to achieve any measure of substantial success 
the practitioners of foreign policy at all levels must clearly and precisely articulate the 
policy that would lead to the proper use of SC as a strategy.  Author Colin Gray 
illustrates the point that strategy and policy are not synonyms in one of his monographs. 
Strategy and policy are not synonymous. However, a sustainable strategy can serve only 
a sustainable policy. If the latter oscillates, the former becomes impractical. This 
monograph targets primarily the national, or grand, strategic level of analysis, but it 
cannot ignore the challenge of ascertaining and sustaining a coherent national security 
policy. Carelessly or for stylistic variety, many politicians, analysts, and commentators 
employ the terms policy and strategy interchangeably. This malpractice does not scar 
these pages. The distinction matters crucially and needs to be maintained rigorously. 
Policy sets goals, indeed may well change goals, while strategy is always instrumental. In 
the absence of a reasonably stable policy, strategy becomes literally meaningless; it must 
lack political direction.132 
 
 When the United States entered into the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, President 
George W. Bush was in power and used the events of September 11, 2001 to declare a 
war on terror.  In a series of speeches at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 
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President Bush established the Bush Doctrine, a foreign policy that embraced pre-
emptive strike and unilateral action against perceived enemies of the United States.  The 
Bush Doctrine embodies the philosophy of offensive liberalism and its goal of exporting 
the values of the United States through the use of military might.  Declaring war on 
Afghanistan and Iraq was the strategy employed by the United States to achieve the 
policy goals outlined in the Bush Doctrine.  Policy and strategy were complimentary in 
this case and would continue to remain so during George W. Bush’s time in the White 
House.  In the final year of the Bush administration a concerted effort was made to 
develop a responsible exit strategy from the Iraq war. One of the requirements that the 
United States had to meet in order to support an exit from Iraq was the rebuilding of the 
infrastructure that was dismantled immediately after the invasion and the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team was the tool that the United States would use to rebuild Iraq.  The 
election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and his promise to end the war in Iraq led to 
the disassociation of policy from strategy. 
 President Obama’s grand proclamation to end the war in Iraq was hollow rhetoric 
because he did not have a coherent foreign policy to replace the ideas expressed in the 
Bush Doctrine that were fertilized by the philosophy of offensive liberalism.  In the 
absence of a substantive foreign policy, President Obama and his National Security 
Council began to repurpose the existing reconstruction strategy that was implemented by 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and give it the label of security cooperation in an effort 
to distance himself and his administration from the Bush legacy. Perhaps unwittingly the 
2010 National Security Strategy adopted language that expressed the cooperative 
philosophy of defensive liberalism and inappropriately selected peacetime strategies to 
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carry out the mission of reconstruction that was established during the Bush 
Administration. 
 Policy that expresses the cooperative philosophy of defensive liberalism and a 
strategy of security cooperation are complementary.  The United States could use security 
cooperation as a means to export its democratic ideals peacefully and distance itself from 
the improper use of security cooperation as a tool for reconstruction in Afghanistan. To 
begin with, realistic expectations of SC capabilities must be formed during key leader 
engagements.  During key leader engagements both the Department of Defense and State 
Department could participate in conversations with political leadership from the host 
nation on policy and strategy.  During these executive level meetings the expectations of 
what SC can achieve are discussed, policy expectations are presented as goals, and 
resources from both countries are allocated to achieve agreed upon goals.  During these 
engagements leadership from both countries are developing a shared vision on the future 
of the host nation.  Importantly the U.S. has been invited to participate in the realization 
of the host nation’s vision.  Key leader engagements ultimately manage the expectations 
of both countries and define agreed upon realistic and achievable goals.  The U.S. policy 
and strategy toward Afghanistan does not achieve this and results in the current 
unrealistic expectation that security cooperation will achieve the goal of reconstructing 
Afghanistan.       
 Two basic tenets of a SC strategy are voluntary participation and Phase 0 
implementation.  A country that voluntarily participates in a SC strategy with the U.S. is 
deliberately choosing to invest its resources in achieving common goals that benefit both 
the U.S. and the host nation.  Implementing a SC strategy prior to the onset of conflict 
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allows both the U.S. and the participating country to focus on agreed upon goals instead 
of conflict.  Vested interest on behalf of a host nation is critical to the success of SC, 
when a country acts as equal partner with the U.S. and is not distracted by the fall out of 
conflict it is reasonable to expect common desires shared between two countries will be 
achieved.  Estonia and Philippines are two examples of successful voluntary participation 
in U.S. SC strategies that were implemented during phase 0.  The current Afghanistan 
reconstruction plan and the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq that 
are paraded around as SC does not meet either one of these basic tenets.  
 The strategy of SC was foisted onto Afghanistan.  The people of Afghanistan did 
not ask to be invaded by the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
The reconstruction obligation placed on the U.S., as a result of its invasion, forces 
Afghanistan to participate in a process it does not embrace. The U.S. has placed 
Afghanistan in a dilemma.  Afghanistan can reject current U.S. policy and use its 
sovereignty to eject the U.S. and all countries participating in the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.  This course of action may be emotionally satisfying to 
the Islamic Republic however logically it would cause a power vacuum to form and the 
country would revert to a state of civil and tribal war.  Alternatively Afghanistan can 
prevent a power vacuum by allowing the U.S. and ISAF to remain in Afghanistan.  By 
continuing to support the current U.S. policy Afghanistan tacitly allows the U.S. to apply 
the wrong strategic resources in an effort to achieve the policy goals identified by 
Secretary Clinton.  Based on the current situation it appears that Afghanistan will allow 
the U.S. and ISAF to remain in Afghanistan and execute its faulty SC strategy.   
 Given the choice between allowing Afghanistan to fall into chaos or allow the U.S. 
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to stubbornly continue on a wrong strategic course of action the political leadership in 
Afghanistan truly has no choice at all.  The government of Afghanistan has little if any 
input into the policy and strategy described by the Secretary of State.  The U.S. has 
shackled Afghanistan to its strategy and denied the political leadership any opportunity to 
freely participate in the misidentified SC strategy to reconstruct Afghanistan.  At its very 
core the current policy and strategy that identifies SC as the way to successfully 
reconstruct Afghanistan is antithetical to the accurate definition of SC. 
 Accepting the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan were wars engaged in as a result 
of offensive liberalism and using the tools of reconstruction to put an end to the current 
conflicts will best preserve the potential good that can emerge from a properly employed 
strategy of security cooperation.  Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the 
National Security Council an opportunity to redraft the National Security Strategy and 
employ security cooperation as it was intended.  Policy rooted in the philosophy of 
defensive liberalism could be used to peacefully export the ideals of democracy through 
security cooperation activities.  As a strategy that is properly aligned with policy goals, 
security cooperation is an effective method of promulgating friendly international 
relationships that are mutually beneficial to the host nation and the United States, and has 
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Definition of Terms 
area of responsibility — The geographical area associated with a combatant command 
within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct 
operations. Also called AOR. See also combatant command.133  
 
combatant command — A unified or specified command with a broad continuing 
mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, 
through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional 
responsibilities. See also specified command; unified command.134 
 
combatant command (command authority) — Nontransferable command authority 
established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, Section 164, exercised 
only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command 
authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform 
those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing 
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative 
direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to 
accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command 
authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. 
Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and 
Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command 
authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces, as the 
combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational 
control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. 
See also combatant command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical 
control.135 
 
combatant commander — A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant 
commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. See also combatant 
command; specified combatant command; unified combatant command.136 
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  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations; 
Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 601. 
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  Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 
Center, Joint Operation Planning; Director for Joint Force Development, Department of 
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135
  Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations; 
Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 





Department of Defense (DOD) components — The Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant 
commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in 
the Department of Defense.137 
 
DOS — Department of State.138  
 
host nation — A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 
NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 
Also called HN.139 
 
national defense strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for 
applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of 
Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security 
strategy objectives. Also called NDS.140  
 
National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security 
strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. See also National 
Security Strategy; strategy; theater strategy.141  
 
National Security Council — A governmental body specifically designed to assist the 
President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice 
President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called 
NSC.142 
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and Associated Terms, ed. Chairman, US NATO Military Terminology Group, Vol. Joint 
Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 427. 
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  United States Joint Forces Command, Stability Operations; Director for Joint Force 
Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 601 
140
 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Operations; 
Director for Joint Force Development, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 601 
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NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization.143 
 
provincial reconstruction team — An interim interagency organization designed to 
improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a 
host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and 
delivering essential government services. Also called PRT.144 
 
reconstruction —  The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, 
socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the 
foundation for longer-term development.145 
 
security assistance — Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, 
and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 
national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation 
funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of 
Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. See also security 
cooperation.146 
 
security cooperation — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 
nation. Also called SC. See also security assistance.147 
 
stability operations — An overarching term encompassing various military missions, 
tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 
provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief.148 
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USAID — United States Agency for International Development.149 
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